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Introduction
In recent years, Europe has witnessed an accelerated process of economic integration: Within the EU market barriers were removed, the Euro was introduced in twelve member states and ten new member states joined the EU in 2004. On a global level, the EU is confronted with the rapid development of several Asian countries, the membership of China in the WTO and the emergence of China and India as new world powers.
This trend towards market integration and globalization opens up European economies to international trade and foreign competition. This is seen in Table 1 where selected indicators of trade openness and its evolution are reported for the EU. This integration and globalisation process affects European labor markets. In line with research for the US, several authors have found that international trade matters for the evolution of European employment and wages levels, f.e. Abraham and Konings (1999) , Kramarz (2003) and Brock and Dobbelaere (2006) . This research furthermore suggests that structural rigidities in European product and labor markets are a key factor in the transmission from global trade shocks to labor markets. Those rigidities are closely related to wage and price setting practices which are determined by factors such as the monetary policy regime, the integration of product markets, the existence of collective agreements and the bargaining power of unions and employers.
This growing interest in structural rigidities underlies the recent research that explores the impact of globalisation on price and wage setting behavior. As Rodrik (1997) points out, globalization weakens the bargaining position of trade unions as it increases the substitutability of employees. This hypothesis is tested in a growing number of empirical studies. Spillovers between product and labor markets are also emphasized in various macro models that show how more competitive pricing in the product markets has beneficial effects, such as lower unemployment rates, on labor market outcomes (e.g. Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2003) . This paper adds to this research by focusing on the Belgian case. We analyze how price-cost margins in firms are affected by international competition, taking explicitly into account that firms bargain over wages and employment with trade unions. Most papers study imperfections in product and labor markets separately 1 . However, ignoring labor market imperfections when measuring competitiveness in the product market, leads to product market power being underestimated. We correct for this problem by measuring simultaneously price-cost margins and union bargaining power. In doing so, we analyse the effects of increased international economic integration on both price-cost margins of firms and the bargaining power of trade unions. To this end, we rely on a rich panel of Belgian firms that operate in the manufacturing sector between 1996 and 2003.
Our focus on Belgium and on Belgian firm data is motivated by various reasons.
First, Belgium is characterized by strong labor unions and rigid product markets. It therefore provides an interesting benchmark to test how international integration affects a small regulated economy in the core of the European Union. Second, the firm level data available are unusually rich. Our data set includes all firms between 1996 and 2003 that have to submit by Belgian law full or abbreviated company accounts. In light of the recent insights of Melitz (2003) and others on the role of firm heterogeneity in international trade it seems natural to use micro data to model the effects of international competition. Third, Belgium is characterized by a substantial increase in its volume of trade. Figure 1 shows how the value of trade in Belgium has nearly doubled during the last decade. As a consequence almost all manufacturing sectors experienced a rising import penetration between 1995 and 2003 (see Figure 2 ).
The increase in import penetration was especially pronounced in Chemicals and
Motor Vehicles.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we develop a stylised theoretical framework that captures the effects of international competition on pricecost margins and labor market outcomes. Section 3 introduces the model that we seek to estimate and discusses the estimation strategy. In particular, we start from Hall (1988) to estimate price-cost margins, but extend the model to allow for bargaining as pointed out by Crépon et al. (2002) . In doing so, we introduce an estimation strategy that offers an alternative to using instrumental variables, which is due to Olley and Pakes (1996) . Section 4 summarizes the results. Section 5 concludes the paper.
The Effects of Globalization: Theoretical Background
To focus ideas it is useful to introduce a standard benchmark model with one production factor labor. The model illustrates how interactions between the product and the labor market matters for understanding equilibrium unemployment. It is built around two crucial equations, the first being a wage-setting relation, the second a price-setting relation.
Turning to the wage equation first, let the nominal wage level depend on the actual price level (P) 2 and on a function that captures the institutional factors that determine wages or
Where W stands for the nominal wage, u for the unemployment rate, z for all other factors affecting the wage. Typically, the unemployment rate exerts a negative influence on the wage. The intuition is straightforward: a higher unemployment rate weakens the bargaining position of workers and so lowers the wage.
A similar equation can be derived for the price-setting behavior of firms. To keep things simple, we assume that prices are set as a simple mark-up over the wage or 2 Typically, it depends on the expected price level, but for simplicity we assume that the expected prices are equal to the actual prices. In the Belgian context of wage indexation this is a reasonable assumption.
In equation (2) the degree of competition in the product market plays a determining role. In a non-competitive product market, prices are set significantly higher than marginal cost (W in this model) resulting in a large mark-up μ. In a perfectly competitive market, μ=0 and prices are fully determined by the wage (hence the real wage W/P reaches a maximum value equal to 1). Figure 3 shows the equilibrium point A in this simple economy, where the price-setting relation is equal to the wage-setting relation. Through its impact on the mark-up μ, the degree of competition in the product market has an impact on the equilibrium unemployment rate. Hence, characteristics of the product market affect the equilibrium outcome in the labor market.
How does economic integration in the product market spill over to the labor market in this simple framework? A variety of theoretical models show that economic integration causes μ to fall e.g. when integration makes more product varieties available (Krugman, 1979) and/or reduces the market share of domestic firms (Helpman and Krugman, 1985) . In Figure 3 international competition therefore shift the price-setting equation upwards: for given wage levels, prices are lower and hence real wage costs for firms rise to a level closer to the competitive benchmark. As a consequence, profit rates for individual companies decline. In addition, international economic integration changes the wage-setting relationship. For a given unemployment rate, lower profit rates translate in smaller rents that can be redistributed to union members. If globalization moreover implies that multinational enterprises can shift employment across affiliates more easily 3 , then the bargaining power of workers will decline. All of this will force union members to accept wage moderation, shifting the wage setting curve down. The new equilbrium is found in B.
Compared to the initial equilibrium in A, unemployment has gone down, prices and nominal wages are lower and the markup μ' of prices over wage costs has been reduced.
The bottom-line from this analysis is that spillovers between product and labor markets matter for understanding equilibrium unemployment of an economy. It is also clear though that the effects of international competition depend very much on the slopes and the responsiveness of the wage and price-setting relations in the economy, which is ultimately an empirical question. This is what we take up in the rest of the paper.
Model and Methodology
The model relies on the work of Hall (1988) 
Where it A captures the productivity level. The function (.) F is homogeneous of degree λ + 1 for all input factors, i.e. the returns to scale are λ
) returns to scale. By taking a total differential of (3) we get:
The variables it it it it k m l q , , , a n d it a are the natural logarithms of
ε is the elasticity of output with respect to input X , namely
. Now, we use the first order conditions of profit maximization, which imply that 4 . In particular, the typical Nash bargaining problem can be summarized as follows:
4 For an application of this approach to the Belgian context see also Dobbelaere (2004) Where
, and a w represents the alternative wage 5 .
Φ is the union bargaining power; 1 0 ≤ Φ ≤ . Maximizing the equation for employment and wage rate gives the following first order conditions:
Solving these two expressions simultaneously gives an expression for the contract curve,
together with (8) and the expression for the contract curve, one can find that:
Combining equations (4) and (10), an extra term which captures the union bargaining power appears in equation (6) 
This will be our basic equation used in the further analysis and allows us to estimate price cost margins and bargaining power simultaneously without having to make assumptions about the alternative wage rate. Crépon et al. (2002) show that in this setting the price-cost mark-up must be interpreted as the ratio of price over cost evaluated at the alternative wage instead of the bargained wage 6 . A potential problem with estimating (11) is the endogeneity of the unobserved productivity shock,
Since it l is a variable input, it depends on the productivity it a in the same period. One solution is to use an instrumental variables approach. Unfortunately, it is often difficult to come up with appropriate instruments. Our alternative approach is based on recent findings of the productivity literature, more specifically on the methodology to estimate production functions developed by Olley and Pakes (1996) .
We follow Hoekman and Kee (2003) and De Loecker and Warzynski (2006), who have applied this methodology to estimate price-cost margins. In a nutshell this approach proxies the unobservable productivity shock by a polynomial in capital and investment, both in present and lagged values. As discussed in the Appendix to this paper, this yields reliable estimates for the Lerner index and for union bargaining power but does not allow a separate identification of the returns to scale parameter.
Data and Results

Data
Firm data are taken from the Belfirst database. The database includes the full company accounts of every Belgian firm that has to report to the tax authorities. It includes the whole manufacturing sector (NACE code 15 to 36) with the exception of the recycling sector. We retrieved data for the period 1996 to 2003. The variables used for the analysis are turnover, tangible fixed assets, number of employees (in full time equivalents), wage bill and material costs (raw materials, consumables and services). Turnover is deflated with a Producer Price Index at the 3 digit NACE level provided by Eurostat. If this PPI was not available for the sector, a 2 digit NACE deflator was used. Tangible assets are deflated using a countrywide investment deflator and material costs are deflated with a countrywide intermediate goods deflator. The database provides also information about the ownership structure, so we are able to determine whether a firm has a foreign owner. However we only observe ownership in 2003. Industry production data is retrieved from the PRODCOM database at a 4 digit NACE level. Imports and source country of imports, are made available by the National Bank of Belgium also at the 4 digit NACE level.
In order for a firm to be added to the sample, we required at least three consecutive observations in our sample. In addition, we dropped observations which seemed to be obvious data input mistakes (such as firms with negative wage costs)
and observations for which the growth rates in inputs and output were unrealistically high. About 4% of the data were dropped by this cleaning procedure. Our final sample consists of an unbalanced panel of 6091 firms and in total 35075 observations. In Table 2 we report summary statistics. The median firm has 20 employees, earns a revenue of 3.7 million euros and faces a labor cost of 34,400 euros per employee per year. The labor cost share in total turnover is about 23% in the average manufacturing firm.
Results
We start by estimating equation (6) and (11) to first obtain an estimate of the average mark-up without and with controlling for the bargaining power of the union.
In a second set of regressions we augment equation (11) with factors that capture international economic integration. Table 3 reports the results for the mark-up and bargaining power in the combined sample of all manufacturing companies. In the first column we report a simple OLS estimate of equation (6). In the second column we provide OLS estimates of equation (11) where we control for the bargaining power of firms. Finally in the third column we apply the Olley-Pakes correction to equation (11) in order to correct for potential endogeneity of the right hand side variables. All equations are estimated with year and industry dummies, capturing time and industry specific shocks 7 .
From column (1), it can be seen that the average mark-up 8 in Belgian industry is around 1.28. This increases to 1.35 when we take into account that unions bargain over wages and employment with employers. The Olley-Pakes correction in the last column does not affect our results all that much 9 .
The estimate of the average mark-up is in line with earlier work by Konings, markup. This positive correlation is clearly shown in Figure 6 where we plot the union bargaining power against the mark-up for each sector. The statistically significant Pearson correlation coefficient between the two parameters equals 0.46.
11
Those results suggest that unions are able to negotiate successful deals in sectors with substantial economic rents but find limited room for wage gains in competitive sectors where the average mark-up is low.
In Table 4 we turn to the impact of globalization on mark-ups and union bargaining power. The first three columns report OLS estimates, while the last three report the same specifications but with the Olley-Pakes correction. We start by augmenting equation (11) with import penetration 12 and interactions of import penetration with the right hand side variables in (11) , to test whether higher import penetration is associated with lower mark-ups and lower bargaining power 13 . As discussed in section II, we expect that import competition lowers mark-ups as more import competition disciplines firm price setting behaviour. We expect the union bargaining power to be lower in sectors with high import penetration rates. From columns (2) and (5) we note that import penetration has indeed a negative and strongly significant effect on the mark-up and on the bargaining power of unions 14 .
Column (5) shows that a 10 percentage point increase in import penetration lowers the 11 The same exercise was done using different depreciation levels to compute investment to correct for the unobservable productivity growth using Olley-Pakes. We also experimented with a system GMM estimator as in Blundell and Bond (1998), using lagged employment and output as instruments. The results did not change. 12 Import penetration in sector j is defined as:
jt jt jt production imports imports + . 13 Whenever the interaction between a variable and the Lerner index term or bargaining term is included, the variable itself also enters the equation, but results are omitted here. 14 As noted above, also import penetration itself is included in the regression. The coefficient is positive and highly significant. Under the classical interpretation of the left hand side variable in equation (11) as the Solow residual, this implies that sectors with higher import competition are more productive than less open sectors.
Lerner index by 0.011. The impact of import penetration on the union bargaining power is slightly lower. As a robustness check, column (2) is also estimated using a model with firm fixed effects. The results, reported in column (7), show no quantitative nor qualitative differences with the pooled OLS or Olley-Pakes estimates.
In columns (3) and (6) we add a dummy LARGE which equals one if the firm has more than 50 employees. This dummy interacted with bargaining captures an essential aspect of firm level bargaining in the Belgian economy. Large firms have different legal obligations for union representation than small firms. In large firms it is moreover easier to organize a strike which can put pressure on the negotiations.
Hence we expect the LARGE dummy to be positive. The OLS results finds this to be the case but this size effect becomes insignificant when applying the Olley-Pakes correction.
In this same specification we also check whether the share of employment in foreign firms 15 in total sectoral employment matters for the bargaining power. One would expect this interaction to be negative since multinationals may be more footloose than domestic firms and as a result unions fear multinationals will reallocate their production. However, the interaction shows up to be positive and significant using the Olley-Pakes correction. This could be explained by international rent sharing where workers in affiliate plants are able to capture part of the parent company's profits (Budd et al. 2005 ) 16 Finally, the Lerner index and bargaining term were interacted with a foreign owner dummy 15 and an EMU dummy 17 . The interactions show up to be insignificant except for the impact of foreign ownership on the Lerner index and the interaction between the EMU dummy and union bargaining power. Surprisingly, the results show that foreign firms have a lower mark-up than domestic firms. Most theoretical and empirical literature shows however that foreign firms are more efficient than domestic firms and should therefore, all other things equal, be able to charge a higher mark-up.
A possible explanation could be that foreign firms produce mainly for world markets, which typically are more competitive. 15 A foreign firm is a firm which has any foreign owner in 2003. 16 Note that our framework does not explicitly take into account international rent sharing. The bargaining power is a measure for the share of domestic rents captured by the union. Because of international rent sharing, more rents go to the union but this does not mean that the true union bargaining power is higher. 17 This dummy equals one in 1999 and the years afterwards.
The above results show that sectors with high import penetration rates tend to have lower mark-ups and union bargaining power. Now, we distinguish between the different source countries of imports. In our dataset we observe for each 4 digit NACE sector the amount of imports coming from each country. We classify all countries in four groups, namely imports from other EU 15 countries, imports from the 10 new EU members, imports from OECD countries other than EU 25 and countries other than EU 25 and OECD. The last category can be seen as a low wage countries group. Import penetration from country group k in sector j is now defined We use these figures to estimate whether mark-ups are correlated differently with import penetration from different countries. Results are shown in Table 5 . The interaction between import penetration and the right-hand side variables has a negative sign for all different country groups, except for the new EU member states.
The only interaction that is strongly significant is the one with imports from low wage Table 5 confirm this hypothesis. While these results indicate that outsourcing is associated with efficiency gains, this process could still coincide with job destruction as firms are contracting out tasks which could be performed abroad more efficiently. We can also note that bargaining power increases with increased outsourcing, which suggests that the Kramarz hypothesis holds. 21 Intermediate inputs are defined as inputs coming fom industrial sectors (NACE 15 to 36) 22 These tables are made every five years, the most recent was from 2005 and used data from 2000. 23 Growth = (outsourcing2000-outsourcing1995)/outsourcing2000
Conclusions
Europe has witnessed the last decade an accelerated process of economic integration. Within the EU, trade barriers were removed and the euro was introduced.
The EU has been enlarged with ten new member states and imports from low wage countries have risen dramatically. Economic integration is likely to have an impact on labor and product markets which are both characterized by structural rigidities. Most papers study the impact of economic integration on product and labor markets separately although they are clearly interlinked. Our paper bridges this gap by looking at the link between globalization and product and labor market imperfections simultaneously. To do this, we rely on a rich panel of Belgian manufacturing firms.
The model we use, allows us to estimate product market power and union bargaining power together.
Several results emerge from our estimations. We show that union bargaining power and product market power are positively correlated. Unions are able to negotiate successful deals in sectors with high mark-ups, while they are more reluctant to press for high wage claims in more competitive sectors.
Concerning the impact of globalization, we find sectors with high import penetration rates to have significantly lower mark-ups and union bargaining power.
This result is consistent with the imports as market disciplining device and several papers that look at the impact of globalization on union bargaining power.
Furthermore, we split up import penetration rates with respect to the country where the imports come from. Especially imports from low wage countries are shown to be concentrated in sectors characterized by low mark-ups and bargaining power. Finally we show that sectors that have been rationalizing their production process by outsourcing part of their production, tend to have higher mark-ups and union bargaining power. Appendix: Controlling for the unobserved productivity shock
We start from an adjusted version of equation (4) (1996) show that in equilibrium, investment at period t is a function of capital and productivity in period t . This expression states the unobservable change productivity shock as a function of observables. Proxying for this function by a polynomial in capital and investment, both in present and lagged values, allows us to control for the unobserved productivity shock in equation (11) . As a result reliable estimates for the Lerner index and union bargaining power are obtained; Because of the construction of a polynomial in investment and capital to proxy for the unobserved productivity shock, it is not possible to separately identify an estimate for the returns to scale.
Rewriting equation (A2) , the equations, under the assumption of perfect competition on the labour markets and an efficient bargaining framework respectively 24 24 Note that the efficient bargaining framework seems to be inconsistent with the Olley-Pakes methodology at first sight. Olley and Pakes (1996) assume perfect competition in the labour market, so firms can freely adjust their labor stock at a given wage rate. However, Belgian firms can react to productivity shocks by making use of temporarily labor contracts and interim labor. All this at a given wage rate, since this is negotiated every two years in the joint commission the firm belongs to.
